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241060
24 OCT 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Support)

SUBJECT : Inspector General's Report on the CIA Training Program

REFERENCE : Memo dtd 5 Oct. 1960 to D/Sec fr DD/S,
subj: "Responses of DD/S Office Heads and Staff Chiefs to the Inspector General's Report on Training in CIA"

1. This memorandum is for your information.
2. Enumerated below are the Office of Security's reactions to the subject report presented in the manner suggested in the referenced memorandum.
3. Office of Security Reaction To The Contents Of The Report As A Whole:

Extremely well written, the Inspector General's report does three things: projects an image of CIA's over-all training program; effects an evaluation of its effectiveness; and finally, by thirty-six specific recommendations, prescribes remedies for the perceived ills in the current training efforts. By employing an ambitious research approach, an impressive volume of factual material on CIA training has been surfaced. By using a sound outline and clear exposition, the mass of facts emerge in a tightly organized package that effectively portrays the over-all anatomy of CIA's training program and successfully identifies many of its strengths and weaknesses. In its third dimension, prescribing remedial actions, the report appears to enjoy uneven success.

While many of the recommendations, particularly those stressing the need for greater definition of training objectives and requirements, now and in the future, seem of obvious value, certain others, notably in the area of the JOT Program, appear highly suspect and in some cases totally objectionable.

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The report tends to communicate a kind of pro-Office of Training bias. This statement is not meant to depreciate at all the excellent record of the Office of Training or of Colonel Matthew Baird over the last ten years. It is rather to suggest that there is a "consumer side" to the report's implied criticism that the consumer is to blame for the absence of a general conviction on the place of training in career development. The consumer might well assert that the lack of solid evidence on the real value of certain CIA training offerings has contributed as much to the current ambiguous situation as anything else. Until controlled validation studies are conducted which clearly relate successful performance in a training situation with successful performance on the job, the current and distressing ambivalence on the "place" of training, at least some kinds of training, will continue.

The above point might be restated as follows. The IG report seems insufficiently probing in the all-important area of training evaluation to determine training validity. The report properly notes with alarm that the lack of stable doctrine decreases training course validity. Yet it makes no mention of the fact (documented by countless experimental researches in government and industry) that even where course content is sound--it teaches what it should teach for the job ahead--and even where the students learn what is taught, the training may still be a failure in that the learning is not converted into on-the-job behavior.

All of this may explain why some Agency supervisors remain unconvinced that this course or that course adds any significant increment to the productivity, creativity, job satisfaction, or motivation of a subordinate. No amount of random generalization (often sounding suspiciously like a plea for training for the sake of training) will change this skepticism found in such supervisors. What will change this attitude is hard evidence, acquired only through rigorous validation studies which correlate training courses with job performance. Such evidence does not come cheaply nor easily. That the IG report fails to recommend the mounting of many such studies appears to be a curious omission and a serious weakness in the final product.

The IG report on CIA training is, the above statements notwithstanding, a provocative, stimulating document. It cannot

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help but prompt serious thinking and action on matters deserving such. The adoption of certain of its recommendations will produce marked improvements. What the report does to promote further research and study, self-analysis and self-examination within the Agency may be, however, its greatest value.

4. Office of Security Reactions To Eight Specific Recommendations:

a. It is recommended that:

The Directors of Personnel and Training together with representatives from operating components take a fresh look at the over-all problem of clerical usage and make recommendations for a more effective system. This should be followed by an OTR reassessment of the clerical training program. (Page 24)

Office of Security Reaction:

This appears to be a completely sound recommendation. Any study which could lead to improvements in the recruitment, assessment, training, and utilization of clerical personnel must be encouraged and the Office of Security is ready to assist in the execution of such a study if such OD participation is appropriate.

b. It is recommended that:

The Director of Training experiment with the concept of a board of overseers composed of senior grade professional officers as a means to improved communication with and indoctrination of consumers, and to promote the development of more effective policies on curriculum and enrollment. (Page 40)

Office of Security Reaction:

This is an excellent recommendation. The Office of Training needs as much contact with the consumers as possible. Only through such contacts will significant

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strides be made in the development of so-called "training doctrine"--which answers the question of what to teach. In addition, such contacts facilitate feedback to OIR to help measure the validity of course content and the efficiency of teaching methods and techniques.

c. It is recommended that:

The Director of Training confer with the Commanding Officers of the Army and Air Reserve units to see if more practical reserve training, e.g., International Communism, could be handled by OIR for the reservists. (Page 52)

Office of Security Reaction:

This is an excellent proposal. Any efforts to have CIA reservists effect annual tours of training duty which support long-range Agency goals would appear irrefutably sound.

d. It is recommended that:

(a). The DCI establish as Agency policy that all junior professional officers enter Agency employ through the JOEP. (Page 92)

(b). The Director of Training establish a JOEP Selection Panel composed of line officer representation from the three Deputy Directorates together with appropriate representation from the Office of Personnel and Training. The Chief, JOEP, should chair the panel. (Page 92)

(c). The Director of Training should give consideration to the feasibility of the use of outstanding public citizens in the panel selection process recommended above. (Page 92)

Office of Security Reaction:

The Office of Security stands resolutely opposed to recommendations (a) and (c) listed immediately above.

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The idea that all junior professional officers enter the Agency through the JOETP is the single most unattractive proposal in the IG report. It can be refuted best by an objective look at the ten-year record of the Office of Security in effectively recruiting its own junior professional personnel using largely its own contacts, its own selection criteria, and its own selection devices. The strength of this refutation lies in its being based on empirical evidence. It is firmly believed that the very foundations of this Agency's security program would be threatened by any policy which would force a change in OS recruitment tactics, which have already passed the acid test for us. They have done the job. This is not to say that the Office of Security seeks to remain completely aloof from the Junior Officer Training Program. It would be desirable for the JOET Staff to be knowledgeable of the requirements for the generalists and the various specialists within the Security Career Service. Hopefully, this might lead in the future to referrals by JOETP on a selective basis to the Office of Security, while the bulk of OS recruitment and selection activity would operate as in the past.

Recommendation (c) is, first of all, puzzling. What the suggestor has in mind is vague at best. The text suggests that outstanding public citizens will assist in the JOETP panel selection process because "these individuals may have the handicap of limited acquaintance with intelligence but they may also contribute useful insight based on long experience in government, corporation or university administration." A more debatable premise cannot be found in the IG paper. The literature in the field of personnel psychology clearly documents the fact that virtually the same fundamental problems in selection exist everywhere in the working world. How outsiders from the government, from corporations or from universities could leave their own unsolved selection problems and arrive on the scene to solve CIA's is difficult to fathom. In addition, the security problem which is telegraphed by this recommendation is very serious. To employ outsiders appears completely incongruous with both the cover and security aspects of the Junior Officer Training Program.

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Recommendation (b) suggests the establishment of a JOT Selection Panel with representation from the three Deputy Directorates, the Office of Personnel, and the Office of Training. This seems to be an enlightened proposal. It seems appropriate to add that Office of Security representation on such a panel may have considerable justification. The recently headlined "Martin-Mitchell" case suggests that junior officer selection by sensitive agencies cannot afford to ignore the vital security dimension, even at the earliest applicant-screening stages of the selection process. The inherent dangers of a selection process oriented too much toward "bright young men" and too little toward security acceptability have now been fully demonstrated.

e. It is recommended that:

The DCI authorize and direct the establishment of a mid-career training course for officers at the GS-12 and -13 level in order to prepare them for broader responsibilities particularly in the field of command, to refresh their motivation in the intelligence service and to broaden their understanding of the interrelationship of Agency functions. (Page 149)

Office of Security Reaction:

The Office of Security extends its unqualified endorsement of this recommendation.

f. It is recommended that:

The DCI authorize and direct that a senior officer program be established to develop more officers capable of formulating and evaluating comprehensively policy concerned with intelligence in the U. S. Government generally in keeping with the outline described above. (Page 154)

Office of Security Reaction:

A sound recommendation, completely acceptable to the Office of Security provided such a program is presented exclusively for internal Agency consumption.

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5. Office of Security Reaction To Four Additional Recommendations of Relevance To Security:

a. It is recommended that:

The Director of Training adopt for headquarters administrative and career planning purposes a designation of [] that adequately reflects the scope and purpose of this intelligence training center.
(Page 39)

Office of Security Reaction:

Page 28 of the DI report states, [] is by now well launched toward permanent status as the principal United States Intelligence Training Center and its acceptance and utilization by intelligence personnel for this purpose will be materially hastened by a decision that it be so designated. The concept relates to administrative and career planning practices at headquarters and need not compromise the security plan covering actual use []

How a simple name changing exercise could promote training progress is difficult to imagine. How impulsive action could endanger the security plan [] is easily imagined. The Office of Security recommends additional and cautious study of this matter before any action is taken.

b. It is recommended that:

The courses on International Communism be given publicity and offered to the personnel of other agencies.
(Page 55)

Office of Security Reaction:

This suggestion lacks clarity. The Office of Security, recognizing the excellence of the work done by the School of International Communism (SIC), would agree that more internal publicity is warranted to promote enrollment. Neither the recommendation nor the context makes clear

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what kind of publicity is being endorsed, nor is it clear which other agencies should attend the courses on International Communism. Since classified information is being dispensed in these courses, once again the Office of Security would request more study and analysis of the proposal.

c. It is recommended that:

The DD/P, as well as the DD/I and DD/S, strongly recommend to their division chiefs, assistant directors and other senior officers that they familiarize themselves, through attendance therat, with the contents of the Introduction to Overseas Effectiveness course. (Page 75)

Office of Security Reaction:

The Office of Security, vitally concerned with the matter of behavior of personnel overseas, perceives possibly great potential for the course mentioned. The recommendation is endorsed.

d. It is recommended that:

The Director of Training initiate an amendment to [] which more clearly describes his responsibility to render only advice, guidance and support to the on-the-job training effort. (Page 113)

Office of Security Reaction:

Based upon Office of Security experience, it appears logical to have on-the-job training responsibilities rest with the local offices. It has been shown empirically to work that way anyway. The recommendation appears sound.

6. Final Office of Security Comments On Report:

a. Since the Office of Security, under its Security Education Program, shares with the Intelligence School (OIS) the job of orienting EOD's to the Agency, a comment on the IG's report on this matter deserves our attention.

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The text (Page 13) reflects concern over the ever present dangers of superficiality and boredom in brief treatment of orientation subjects. Why couldn't a representative sample of EOD's be polled on their reactions to their orientation experience? The Office of Security would welcome and doubtlessly profit from such a survey.

b. Over the years, the Office of Security reaction to the Intelligence Orientation Course has been extremely favorable. It has, in the past, and continues now to satisfy a definite training need. We viewed with disappointment the reduction of the Introduction to Intelligence phase of the course from two weeks to one. We view the prospect of the course being eliminated in favor of a "reading course" as a pending misstep.

c. As a heavy consumer of management training over the years, the Office of Security is perhaps in a position to comment on the IG report which suggests that serious problems exist here, i.e., non-participation by the EO's, doubt about the content of the present instruction, etc. The personnel from the Office of Security who return from this course usually report that it was an enjoyable experience, but one lacking in structured instruction, and the transmission of factual material. In short, they cannot seem to come to grips with the material as currently delivered. While this is partially a function of intrinsic ambiguities in the field of management study, this may not be the full explanation. It may be apt to suggest that OER give serious consideration to the presentation of several levels of management courses and that the initial or basic one of the series be mounted as a structured and formal lecture course designed to impart concrete material based on the research studies of recent years in the fields of industrial psychology, personnel psychology, and human relations.

d. On Page 19 of the IG report is found this statement: "There is a further aspect of orientation, namely, written communication, in which the Agency's practice departs from that of most large organizations. For reasons of security few of the usual devices for staff communication, including employee publications, newsletters, annual reports, employee manuals and bulletin boards covering employment opportunities

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and other Agency business, are put to general use by CIA to motivate and integrate its employees into the organization. There is no way of determining what this costs the Agency in quality of service and in employee turnover. The entire field merits new study including the possibility of revision and reissue of the 1952 brochure, 'Your Job in the Central Intelligence Agency.' " With regard to this matter, let it be said that the Office of Security welcomes the initiation of such a study and is ready to participate in it.

7. As a final consideration, it was gratifying to find the very favorable comments in the ID report in the section dealing with component training--including that conducted within the Office of Security.

SIGNED

Sheffield Edwards
Director of Security

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I. Purpose and Scope:

1. Study initiated at DDCI's request to study the nature and extent of CIA's training effort and to evaluate its effectiveness. An Agency-wide functional study.

2. Covers all formal training programs and facilities in Headquarters, including [redacted] and covert training sites [redacted]

3. Operations officers were interviewed, as were students in courses, present and former JOT's, supervisors of technically trained employees, and 100 senior officers from clandestine services. Course contents were studied, duration of courses, their level of instruction, the qualifications and experience of instructors.

4. Comparisons were made with other Government agencies, particularly FSI.

II. Administration of Agency Training:

A. Legal Authority:

Government Employees Training Act of 1958. Executive Order 10,801, dated 30 April 1959, excluded CIA from certain provisions of the Act. The 1958 Act encourages self-training. The authority for CIA to train non-employees is the CIA Act of 1949.

B. Scope of Present Program:

CIA's training effort grew rapidly with the gradual consolidation of programs and a slow evolution of a philosophy. The achievements in induction training have been substantial. In 1960 recruitment in training of professionals for DDP and to meet one-fourth of the requirements of DDI and DDS will be accomplished through JOTP.

In DDS, with its many specialized assignments, there is a trend toward local training programs. The DDI, needing specialists in the social and physical sciences, is oriented toward external training and toward hiring previously trained personnel requiring little extensive training. The DDP, needing competence in clandestine intelligence, now looks to the JOTP and effects advanced training through its own resources.

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Overall, CIA does not program advanced training of career employees, which reflects the uncertainties that exist in the Agency's personnel management program. In other words, there exists no general conviction on the place of training in career development.

Being under the DDS, the Director of Training lacks power to develop and control a unified Agency training policy. He can undertake Agency-wide coordination of training, but lacks power to enforce a common policy.

C. Cost:

The cost in Fiscal Year 1959 totaled [redacted] 25X1
excluding the DDS, DDI, and certain elements of DDP activity. It excludes the cost of training officers and their clerical assistants. It includes salaries of JOT's for their first two years, but does not include other trainees' salaries. A reasonable estimate for all training expenses in the Agency is [redacted] (includes cost of facilities, training personnel, and salaries of trainees.) 25X1
It is doubtful that this figure can be reduced. If economies can be introduced, they will probably come from consolidation of faculties, better scheduling, developing more effective instructors and instructional techniques.

III. Office of Training:

A. Introduction:

The antecedents of CIA's present day training program can be traced to OSS. OTR as now known began on 3 January 1951 with the entrance on duty of Colonel Matthew Baird, who reported to the DCI for five years until 1955, when OTR was brought under DDS. [redacted] was selected as an OTR site in 1951. The Director of Training at the outset was charged with the responsibility of the JOTP, and the first JOTP class began in 1951. It ran for 14 weeks, concentrating on clandestine tradecraft, basic and advanced operations. By 1954, OTR numbered [redacted] persons, where it has remained. In 1953 OTR curriculum was expanded to provide courses in Communism and Management and in such administrative areas as Operations Support and Administrative Procedures. In 1955 the current organization of OTR was effected. 25X1

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There are a large number of relatively autonomous component training programs, and this is due to the diversity of skills and professions employed by intelligence and by the need for compartmentation dictated by security considerations. These local programs appear to be stabilizing themselves in their present locations due to security considerations, limited demands, accessibility, and response to local needs.

The Agency has not, for reasons of security, placed heavy reliance on outside or shared community facilities.

Efforts have occurred in the last ten years to establish training prerequisites for job assignments. Training requirements typically take second place to operational requirements.

In 1956 there was issued a Regulation called "Headquarters Participation in Training." It stipulated that at least 5 per cent of the Agency's total man-hours of Headquarters' "on duty" staff personnel would be devoted to training. The 5 per cent requirement is now in abeyance. The 5 per cent requirement influenced component office training policy and influenced the volume of training provided Agency personnel. The 5 per cent requirement produced orderly inventory of training courses by the component offices of OTR. It led to better programming of training requirements. The requirement contributed to a better Agency-wide training program.

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B. The Intelligence School:

Consists of 5 faculties, including Intelligence Orientation, Intelligence Production, Clerical Training, Operations Support, and Management. No simple definition of justificational lines exists for the school. Orientation, Clerical Training, and Management are Agency-wide responsibilities. Operations Support instruction is for the DDS and DDP. Intelligence Production instruction is for the DDI. The School is in contact with virtually every new employee of the Agency.

The School has been successful in teaching skills; there are problems, however, in the areas of Employee Orientation, Management, and Intelligence Production.

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(d) Comment →
In orienting new employees, the Intelligence School faces difficulties due to diversities in age, grade, and profession. The objectives in orientation are to provide motivation and to impart general facts. There are dangers in superficiality and boredom, and there is no effective measure of results. (Why not have an opinion survey directed at recent arrivals into CIA to determine general reactions to the current EOD orientation efforts)

(d) Comment →
The Intelligence Orientation Course for non-JOT's is now three weeks. The use of reading materials instead of lectures is being tried experimentally and is an attended risk. It is possible that the non-JOT may perceive himself to be a second class citizen.

(d) Comment! →
Also in the field of orientation, CIA departs from other large organizations in that devices for staff communication, including employee publications, newsletters, annual reports, employee manuals, bulletin boards, these things are seldom used in CIA, and this may negatively affect quality or service and employee turnover. Perhaps the 1952 brochure "Your Job in CIA" should be revised.

(d) Comment →
In Management training, the participation by DDP is poor at the present. Instruction is under fire.

Mid-career and senior officer training appears to be essential to compliment what the DDI professionals will get in their special fields through professional activity.

C. Operations School:

The Operations School consists of four programs: Headquarters Training, Field Training , both of which are primarily for staff employees; Covert Training, and Overseas Training for agents and foreign liaison members. Through Thus there is a Headquarters Training Staff, a Field Training Staff, a Covert Training Staff, and an Overseas Training Staff. The Headquarters Training Staff is in greatest contact with DDP. They face frequently problems of poor enrollment, cancellations, and under-employment of instructional staff. 25X1

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[] is on its way to becoming the nerve center for indoctrination for a career in intelligence. It is on its way toward permanent status as the Training Center. One big problem at [] is that the instructors operate under a disorderly rotation plan. The other big problem at [] is the absence of a training doctrine, which is the responsibility of the operating offices. There is no doctrine. The DDI has not yet come to grips with the issue of training in intelligence for its professional specialists. The DDS also requires specialists and expects to hire well-trained individuals from the open market.

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The Overseas Training Staff (Operations School) has today the most complete library of operations "doctrinal" publications available in the Agency. The present scope of the activity is not widely publicized because of the security limitations on general announcement and dissemination of training materials associated with projects.

In criticizing the [] curriculum, it is often said that training in investigative techniques and interrogation techniques is especially weak.

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D. School of International Communism:

Offers three courses and a compressed version of all three for JOT's. Heavy demands are made for tutorial training. No problem of doctrine development here, and good material comes to the school from the International Communism Division, CI Staff. The only problem is to keep abreast of the Communist movement.

E. Language and Area School:

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Regulation [] entitled "Language Development Program". Under it, the Deputy Directors are to establish their requirements and to assure attainment and retention of foreign language proficiencies. The Director of Training is the general director of the program. Foreign language training occurs in these ways: through the Language and Area School, which offers instruction in 18 languages; through other government agencies, chiefly FSI; through colleges and universities and tutorial instruction available [] through the Voluntary Language Program, which offers instruction in approximately 20 languages; through training for Agency personnel at overseas posts. Best security is attained within the Agency's facilities. FSI is best in terms of offering the widest range of languages. In the Language and Area School, there are three faculties: language, area knowledge, and research and administration.

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The current Agency enrollment in language training is surprisingly small. (In Calendar Year 1959 only 97 employees took full-time language training internally, and 39 took full-time language training externally. Also, 480 Agency employees received directed on-duty part-time training at the IAS or externally. Approximately 300 participated in the voluntary off-duty hours program. Almost [] received voluntary training overseas.) The linguists heavily favor full-time training. Of all government agencies, only CIA and NSA offer part-time language courses.

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The Voluntary Language Training Program began in 1957 and has been hurt by too much diffusion, with people dropping out of courses, studying mostly French, German, Spanish, or Italian, or taking languages unrelated to their assignments.

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Language training by tutorial lessons has produced grave problems; it presents security problems and is very expensive. Too much tutoring is asked for due to inadequate planning by supervisors. Wives of staff employees who are native speakers of foreign languages are now used. The use of these tutors means that individual instruction is now available at a level at least as good as that offered by commercial schools. Still, to use this avenue for the four common language of French, German, Italian, and Spanish, and especially to use it for mere beginners in a language of this type, is wasteful. It must be said that full-time language training on a classroom basis is the most effective method, and tutorial training should be used in exceptional cases only.

The Agency appears to be failing in its language training mission. How badly it is failing cannot be accurately measured, since the Deputy Directors have not completely established their language requirements, nor have they completely inventoried their language competencies by objective test procedures administered by the LAS. (Only 25% of personnel claiming language competencies took objective tests to validate same. This testing should be required.

Low language training enrollments seemed to be based on several factors. There is a feeling that a good job can be done without foreign languages (a carry-over from OSS days). Work loads prompt Branch Chiefs to block language training. A fear exists that to learn a language and to acquire area knowledge is to become a specialist, and specialists do not fare as well as generalists in the Agency.

Russian is being ignored in the Agency by even the SR Division.

The supply of Americans having native fluency in foreign languages is drying up.

In the matter of area training, the staple offering is the Americans Abroad Orientation for personnel and dependents going to an area or country for the first time. The current practice is to schedule these courses on request with even short notice. The approach seems to have stimulated an appreciation of this kind of training. Area training seems solid. The longer courses previously employed suffered from lack of students and now are offered only on specific requests.

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The course called "Introduction to Overseas Effectiveness" was developed in 1959 and was designed to sensitize the traveler to a new area. The course seeks to teach the art of assessing and influencing another culture. The course lasts two weeks. The course has been given three times. This course should be thoroughly studied and promoted.

F. The Junior Officer Training Program:

Began in 1951. First recruitment for program handled by the Office of Personnel. As of 1959, there were 238 ~~JOT's~~ JOT graduates on duty with the Agency as follows: 187 or 79% with DDP; 42 or 18 % with DDI; and 9 or 3% with DDS. A loss of 170 JOT students or graduates over the nine years has occurred.

The first phase of JOT training is 10 weeks of instruction at Headquarters on Communism and the structure of the Agency. After 10 weeks, the JOT's are broken into three groups, each headed for one of the Agency's principal directorates. In the future, more JOT's will be directed to DDS. They will be given 10 weeks at [] following their 10 weeks at Headquarters. They will get Operations Familiarization and Operations Planning and Management. 25X1

At the end of approximately 6 months of formal training, JOT's are assigned to 12-18 months of on-the-job training in an operating office. The sponsoring office prepares and submits a training plan for each apprentice for JOT approval. Both the JOT and his supervisor report in writing every four months on the progress of his training. The JOTP has authority to reassign a student if the initial assignment fails to work out satisfactorily.

At the end of 24 months, the JOT must be formally placed, and a system must be developed for this.

The JOTP is authorized henceforth to recruit 142 candidates annually, the excess of ~~123-repre~~ over 123 representing allowances for attrition during training. The JOT rate of 8 for DDS is expected to cover from 15-25% of the annual requirement for professionals in that directorate.

To net 142 trainees will require 3500 field interviews, 800 field referrals, and 400 clearance actions.

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At present there is low representation among JOT's of officers from the South and to a lesser extent from the Far West. Also, concern exists over the heavy recruitment from Ivy League schools.

The Agency has sponsored military training for JOT's, but lost 40% of these cases at the end of the military training.

The JOIP has been oriented from its beginning toward the development of generalists. The program has not undertaken recruitment and training for specialists such as lawyers, accountants, etc., required by DDS. It is certain not certain now whether the new DDI and DDS quotas can be filled by JOT's.

Efforts should be made to have line officers serve on JOIP panels to provide advice on placement policies.

With more JOT's going into the total system, the problems of attrition must be faced.

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The matter of training the specialist professional officer is of special interest. ORR, for example, recruits its professionals already trained from the open market.

The problem with specialists is one of deciding what intelligence training, if any, they need. ORR economists at the moment get only the IOC, for example.

It is certain that value could be realized for DDP and DDI if DDI specialists rotated to be reports officers in DDP and vice versa. The DDP man would see the use to which his reports are put in the DDI. Both DDI and DDS must work with the JOIP to engineer the proper output of specialists out of that program.

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IV. Other Agency Training:

A. Non-OTR Training

OTR provides technical guidance and assistance in setting up the courses, furnishes training materials, testing and other services, monitors the instruction and maintains Training records.

The need for this type of specialized training is unchallenged. Objectives are clearly defined and standards are uniformly high. It is directed at the people who need it and since it is under local control it is taken as required. It comes closest to having the chief qualities of the ideal training situation in which needs, requirements, standards, methods of instruction, course content, level and duration, and attendance are all given direction by a single authority.

There is a dangerous tendency to extend some of these courses from essentially specialized training of a well defined limited group of employees into the larger area of general training by inviting attendance by non-careerists whose assignments are only remotely reflected to the specific subject being taught.

The Inspector General favors centralization of training wherever the factors of economy, efficiency and effectiveness prevail.

OTR should take over when:

- (1). There is a demonstrated need for training employees other than members of the sponsoring career service.
- (2). Additional training facilities are needed.
- (3). The course content or doctrine is derived from or substantially augmented by another career service.
- (4). The program requires additional manpower either for instruction or support.

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B. External Training

Authority for it is found in Agency Reg. revised 23 June 1960.

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C. On-The Job Training

The 1956 requirement of 5% in training was a stimulus to on-the job training.

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Under the Deputy Directors and operating officials are still charged with ensuring that employees are properly trained including on-the job training.

D. Nothing To Add

E. Technical School

Apparently, this school is very effective, although, they lack formal feedback. Seen here again is a lack of training standards; requirements and doctrine.

V. Future of Training In Agency

Training is a function of command. In the Clandestine Services uniform standards for operations officers (both headquarters and field) have not been established nor has officially approved doctrine been prescribed for use in training courses. Training still is permissive and subject to the whims of individuals and lower echelon supervisors. Only those officers entering the Clandestine Service thru JOTP are sure to have fulfilled the operational training required and that is accomplished before they come under the administrative control of the DD/P.

OTR & TSD suffer from scant feedback. There has been a failure to closely relate training to career planning and management.

The JOTP is becoming the principal source of new employees in the professional ranks.

Mid Career Training

For GS-12 to GS-13
For ages 35 to 40
For between 10 and 15 years of service

Senior Officer Course

Four months long for 40 officers
Offered twice a year

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RECOMMENDATIONS

Submits

1. The Directors of Personnel and Training together with representatives from operating components take a fresh look at the over-all problem of clerical usage and make recommendations for a more effective system. This should be followed by an OTR reassessment of the clerical training program. *(Page 24)*

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2. (a). DTR adopt for headquarters administrative and career planning purposes a designation of that adequately reflects the scope and purpose of this intelligence training center. 25X1

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(b). DTR adopt a three-year tour of duty as standard practice for instructors and schedule replacement at the rate of one-third of the instructor staff annually. *p. 40*

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(c). DTR redesignate his Overseas Training Staff to better reflect its expanding function as a clearing house for training doctrine; that its role as a depository and an editorial and coordination staff be negotiated with the Directorates and publicized, including preparation and dissemination of bibliographies under the various security limitations that may apply. *p. 40*

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- (d). Curator, Historical Intelligence Collection, collaborate with Chief, Operations School/OTR, to develop and publicize a working collection of open intelligence literature at [] which will fully reflect the existence and capabilities of the principal collection at headquarters. p. 40

- ✓ (e). DTR experiment with the concept of a board of overseers composed of senior grade professional officers as a means to improved communication with and indoctrination of consumers, and to promote the development of more effective policies on curriculum and enrollment. p. 40

- (f). The DD/P establish in his office a position of DD/P Training and Doctrine Officer having responsibility and authority for the formulation and implementation of Clandestine Service training policy and the development of operational doctrine. p. 40

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3. DD/P take appropriate steps to ensure that DTR be made a participant, through the presence of his representative or through other effective form of consultation, in all long-range planning for the employment or expansion of deep-cover operations. *p. 49* *okay*

- ✓ 4. The DTR confer with the Commanding Officers of the Army and Air Reserve units to see if more practical reserve training, e.g., International Communism, could be handled by OTR for the reservists. *p. 52* *okay*

- ✓ 5. The courses on International Communism be given wider publicity and offered to the personnel of other agencies. *p. 55* *okay*

6. The DD/P instruct all supervisors to observe, in requesting language training, the principle that training in regular classes is the normal and most effective method, and that resort to tutorial training shall be had only in exceptional cases and where required by security considerations, unavoidable pressure of time, or other valid reasons. *p. 64-65* *okay*

7. (1). DCI issue instructions that Agency Regulations be amended by adding new provisions (a) directing the Deputy Directors to identify the categories of employees for whom specified degrees of language proficiency are required and to tie these standards of proficiency into promotion practices, and (b) directing the Deputy Directors to identify those positions, or that proportion of positions, in each overseas station that may be filled only by individuals who possess, to the degree specified, the language commonly used in the general area of that station. *p. 71*
- (2). DCI issue instructions that Agency Regulations be further amended to make language proficiency testing, according to Agency standards, mandatory for all employees who are required to have language skill. *p. 71*
- (3). DD/P direct that in all long-range operational planning the implications with respect to possible radical change in requirements as to the nature or extent of language capabilities be carefully considered and that the conclusions reached be regularly and promptly communicated to the DTR. *p. 71*

- (4). DD/P give clearer recognition to the necessity for developing in larger numbers than at the present rate linguistically qualified area specialists. p. 71 *Key*
- (5). The Deputy Directors take such measures as may be necessary to cause all staff employees under their jurisdiction who claim language competence to submit to the Office of Training tests at the earliest practicable moment. p. 71 *OK*
- (6). DD/P consider the advisability of placing directly on the division chiefs the responsibility for all scheduling of language training for personnel in the division and for monitoring the timely carrying out of the language training thus scheduled. p. 71 *OK*
- ✓ 8. The DD/P, as well as the DD/I and DD/S, strongly recommend to their division chiefs, assistant directors and other senior officers that they familiarize themselves, through attendance thereat, with the contents of the Introduction to Overseas Effectiveness course. p. 75 *OK*

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✓✓ *red*
9. (a). The DCI establish as Agency policy that all junior professional officers enter Agency employ through the JOTP. *p. 92*

✓ (b). The DTR establish a JOT Selection Panel composed of line officer representation from the three Deputy Directorates together with appropriate representation from the Office of Personnel and Training. The Chief, JOTP, should chair the panel. *p. 92*

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✓ (c). The DTR should give consideration to the feasibility of the use of outstanding public citizens in the panel selection process recommended above. *p. 92*

(d). The DTR arrange for the participation on a rotational basis of line officer representation from the three Deputy Directorates in JOTP placement panels. *p. 92*

- ✓ (e). The DTR together with the Director of Personnel take steps to eliminate prejudices that have arisen which tend to assign second status to DD/S and DD/I careers. *p. 92*

OK

- (f). The DD/P establish minimum standards of training and experience for case officer apprenticeship including general preparatory, basic skills, language and advanced operational training, and that he determine the feasibility by experiment of some form of overseas familiarization as a part of the apprentice period. *p. 92*

OK

- (g). The DTR together with the Director of Personnel undertake to monitor the present efforts of the Department of State to improve personnel management and training in the Foreign Service for measures that may be adopted for the Agency's benefit. *p. 92*

OK

10. (1). The DD/I direct that the recruitment and initial training of junior analysts be accomplished through the JOTP; that increased emphasis be placed by the Agency's recruitment facility on the recruitment of JOT's with academic backgrounds suited to DD/I needs; that ORR and other specialists recruitment be phased down as production of JOT's increases and generally limited to senior analysts at the Ph. D. level. *p. 100*

okay

- (2). The DD/I and the DD/P initiate a test program for the rotation of qualified DD/I professionals to the DD/P to serve as reports officers with part of the tour to be spent overseas, DD/P reports officers in turn to rotate to the DD/I for training and experience in the evaluation and use of intelligence reporting. *p. 100*

okay

- (3). Advanced external training for analysts be phased somewhat later in the career pattern, perhaps after the fifth year of duty, to permit maximum play of JOTP and other intelligence preparation during the apprenticeship period. *p. 100*

okay

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11. a. The DTR be specifically charge with the responsibility of determining under whose auspices non-OTR training will be conducted and, p. 105

okay

- b. Pertinent Agency regulations be amended accordingly. p. 105

okay

12. DTR review the training records of employees in professional categories who resigned from the Agency during FY 1960, or longer if necessary, to determine if a more definitive policy governing external training is required. p. 110

okay

- ✓ 13. a. The DCI authorize the establishment of senior grade positions for selected Training Officers at the Assistant Director or DD/P Division Chief level with job qualifications designed to ensure the effective performance of proper training functions. p. 113

okay

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25X1

- ✓ b. The DTR initiate an amendment to [] which more clearly describes his responsibility to render only advice, guidance and support to the on-the-job training effort. p. 113
- OK

14. The DD/P study the extent to which it is feasible to develop a greater capability in technical tradecraft in operations officers, establish minimum standards of technical training as basic to the required preparation of all operations officers and issue policy accordingly for the guidance of the Technical School, TSD. p. 128
- OK

- ✓ 15. The DCI authorize and direct the establishment of a mid-career training course for officers at the GS-12 and -13 level in order to prepare them for broader responsibilities particularly in the field of command, to refresh their motivation in the intelligence service and to broaden their understanding of the interrelationship of Agency functions. p. 149
- OK

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- ✓ 16. The DCI authorize and direct that a senior officer program be established to develop more officers capable of formulating and evaluating comprehensively policy concerned with intelligence in the U. S. Government generally in keeping with the outline described above. *p. 154*

okay

Clerical training raises a host of questions for which there are no simple answers. The basic factor determining present CIA clerical training policy is the difficult market for clerical staff. The Agency has a large requirement for clerical support overseas and out of its own and State Department experience has reached the conclusion that clerical employees under 21 years of age are apt to be too immature to adjust satisfactorily to the living conditions and work pressures of overseas assignments. This limitation and its high standards in recruitment generally throw the Agency into the competition for the highest quality personnel on the market. There are, of course, many other complications, including salary competition and high living costs plus difficult living conditions in the headquarters area. The most important additional factor is the Agency's large-scale employment of young women who are marriageable or, if married, contribute a major element of the attrition rate by reason of childbearing. CIA recruited in excess of clerical personnel during 1959 and could expect according to current experience to have the average clerical employee resign after only 18 months of service.

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The initial location and screening of clerical candidates for employment is performed by CIA field recruiters. These men look in particular to the heads of responsible commercial training schools for leads on desirable candidates. Applicants are required to take United States Employment Service proficiency tests

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wherever possible, where this is not feasible the testing may be waived until EOD on presentation of certification of proficiency by a high school or commercial training institution. Such certification unfortunately has frequently proved to be unreliable. The recruiters themselves present and score a test worked out by OTR's Assessment and Evaluation Staff covering basic aptitudes and personality factors. About 80 per cent of all candidates are rejected in the present period for poor test scores and other deficiencies. The long wait for security clearance is a factor at this point in holding desirable candidates and the Office of Personnel has found it necessary from 1948 forward to bring about half of its clerical recruits on duty in an interim assignment pool in advance of clearance.

Up to this point the Agency has exercised options on the rigorousness of its testing and the decision to EOD in advance of full clearance. It is perhaps inevitable that the recruiters, the clerical trainers and the consumers differ on the policies involved. The trainers understandably hope to start with personnel of high proficiency, instead they frequently meet up with recruits who fail to demonstrate their certified qualifications. The recruiters, with intimate knowledge of the market and in view of the high CIA attrition rate, question the need and results of the ACE testing and the, to them, unrealistic rate of rejection of candidates. Both parties attest to the frequent waste of quality personnel in inadequate assignments. An off-the-cuff estimate is that eight out

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of ten secretaries with shorthand make little or no use of their skill because their executives do not dictate their correspondence.

The clerical faculty offers instruction in typing, shorthand, English usage, and geography. A three-day Agency orientation is provided for clericals cleared for office duty. A packet of these courses is provided at induction for individuals awaiting clearance. The average length of training at this point is three weeks, the range is from one to five weeks. A second packet of courses is provided as refresher instruction for individuals seeking to qualify

25X1

In summary, clerical training must be weighed in the broader context of clerical recruitment, job assignment, utilization and attrition. Must the Agency hire employees who require extensive training in typing and shorthand immediately following entrance on duty? Does the A&E testing applied to clerical candidates justify itself in the light of present-day attrition rates? Are the recruiters reaching segments of the market less subject to attrition due to marriage and childbearing? What portion of clerical loss is due to waste of talent in low quality assignments? The evidence on these matters must be regularly reassessed.

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It is recommended that:

The Directors of Personnel and Training together with representatives from operating components take a fresh look at the over-all problem of clerical usage and make recommendations for a more effective system. This should be followed by an OTR reassessment of the clerical training program.

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